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The Development of Keynesian Macroeconomics
ABSTRACT
Thispaperprovidesanoutline of the historical
development of Keynesian macroeconomics. It first argues that
the business—cycle model of J.M. Keynes's General Theory
featured analytical ingredients that were present in earlier
writingsand attained its theoretical precision only in
contributions made later.Remaining sections of the paper
focus on the key characteristic of Keynesian theory, namely, a
postulated stickiness of nominal prices that enables aggregate
demand to play a greater role in output determination than it
does in flexible—price classical analysis.Three approaches
that have been historically important are ones relying upon (I)
equilibria conditional on givenprices, (ii) algebraic
Phillips-type price adjustment relations, and (iii) equilibrium
analysis with incomplete information.The paper reviews
difficulties with each of these and concludes with a discussion





Pittsburgh, PA 15213In this paperI will address the topic of this session by
outlining the historical development of Keynesian macroeconomics
and adding a few remarks on the issues of today. My version of
the story will agree with textbook accounts in some ways and
differ fairly sharply in others. Very few references will be
provided in support of assertions both because space is tightly
limited and because my version is something of a "stylized
history of thought." The hope is that it will be, like carefully
selected "stylized facts," analytically illuminating although
lacking in detail.
I. John Maynard Keynes
During the past 20 years, there has grown up a body of
literature that promotes the notion that Keynes's own theorizing
was vastly superior to that of the "Keynesian" variety that
typified mainstream macroeconomic analysis in the 1950s and
1960s. In my opinion, the ranking implied by this literature is
precisely the opposite of that which is warranted.
The foregoing contention is based on an evaluation of the
contribution to business—cycle theory provided byKeynes's
General Theory (GT). Any such evaluation must, it seems clear,
be made in light of pre-existing. theory.My own non-extensive
reading of pre-GT writings has led me to the view that the main
analytical ingredients of the GT were distinctly present in the
writings ofAlfred Marshall and his other students. In
particular, Marshall (1887) and Frederick Lavington (1922)
described the mechanism of cyclical fluctuations in a manner that
(I) emphasized the sluggishness of nominal wage adjustments and(ii) utilized multiplier effects to explain the magnitude of
departures from normality.1 Furthermore, the idea that these
fluctuations were viewed as unimportant by the pre—GT Cambridge
writers is soundly refuted by the introductory chapter of
Lavington's little book (1922, pp. 9—12).
Of course the GT had an enormous influence in terms of
introducing new concepts and terminology, posing new issues and
puzzles, and generally redirecting economists' attention. In
addition, the GT represented an ambitious attempt to bring the
Marshallian building blocks together in the form of a detailed,
rigorous, and comprehensive model that would be useful for
aggregative analysis.But in this admirable attempt at formal
theory, Keynes failed. His top—priority goal of articulating a
model with an unemployment equilibrium——in the sense of a
situation from which there is no tendency to depart——foundered on
the Pigou—Patinkin real balance effect. And as a comprehensive
analytical structure, the GT was plagued by various logical
inconsistencies,2 which were straightened out only in the more
careful works of John Hicks (1937), Franca Modigliani (1944), and
Don Patinkin (1956). These clarifications left the profession
with the analytical structure that Keynes had evidently been
seeking.But this structure owed its fundamental ideas to
Marshall and other earlier writers, and its analytical precision
to Hicks, Modigliani, and Patinkin.3
II. Keynesian Macroeconomics
The key characteristic of Keynesian macroeconomics that
distinguishes it from Classical theory is a postulated stickiness
—2—in somenominal Price that enables its value to differ, for
significant spans of time, from the level that would otherwise
(i.e., intheabsence of this friction) be market—clearing.
Demand and supply quantities (defined in the absence of the
friction) can differ, therefore, so fluctuations in nominal
aggregate demand can be much more important for aggregate output
and employment determination than under flexible—price Classical
conditions.
Sluggishness of price adjustments is inherently a dynamic
concept, but the refined Hicks-Modigliani-Patinkin version was,
like the GT itself, expressed in the form of a static model.
Consequently, the way in which price sluggishness had to be
reflected was in the model's concept of a "short run"
equilibrium.Formally, what this amounted to was a mode of
analysis centering on equilibria of a conditional variety: the
refined GT model was designed to determine values of endogenous
variables conditional upon "given" values of specified prices
(most often, nominal wages). This is, to reiterate, the way in
which the hypothesis of slow price adjustments was expressed in a
framework that was formally static.
Now the object of constructing the model was to provide
analytical guidance for the design of macroeconomic policy.But
actual economies are dynamic, not static, so some way had to be
found to relate the model to reality.One possible way of
proceeding would be to choose policy actions at any point in time
(say, t) by treating the current value of the sticky price (say,
Wt) ashistoricallygivenand essentially ignoring the
—3—future——since it can be attended to when it arrives.Then in
period t+1 the wage Wt+i would be treated as historically given,
and a new policy action chosen conditional upon its value. In
this way it would be possible to use the model without ever
developing any explanation for the economy's Wt values.
Of course, it is apparent that this way of proceeding would
be highly undesirable. For even if Wt were actually given in t
as a residue of the past, the particular value prevailing would
certainly have been influenced by economic conditions of the
past. The temporarily-fixed price in the Keynesian model is
properly viewed as a predetermined variable, not an exogenous
variable. So policy actions taken in t will have effects on
future prices——on Wt+i, Wt÷2, etc.——and those effects are ignored
in the procedure under discussion.This point isworth
mentioning in our history because the procedure is a stylized
version of a common method of policy analysis as actually
conducted in the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, the efforts of
many distinguished theorists were devoted to the refinement of
conditional equilibrium models as recently as the late 197O.4
III. Phillips Curves
Many Keynesian analysts r.ecognized the undesirability of
conditional equilibrium analysis, of course, and adopted a
different approach. Rather than treating Wt as coming out of the
blue, this second approach was to add to a static Keynesian model
another equation or sector designed to explain movements over
time5 in the slowly-adjusting priceWt. Then the model would be
dynamic, even if incompletely based on dynamic optimization
—4—analysis, and could be used for policy experiments that would
avoid the particular difficulty described above.
Equations or sectors of this type are versions of the famous
Phillips Curve. As all readers know, most early formulations
wereseverely flawed in the sense of positing adjustment
procedures that involve dynamic money illusion.As Milton
Friedman (1968) effectively noted, these versions carried the
highly implausible implication that a society could permanently
keep its real rate of output high——i.e., enrich itself in real
terms--by continually printing paper money at a rapid pace. A
more proper specification of the Phillips Curve, according to
Friedman, would relate changes in expected real wages to
prevailing levels of output relative to normal.
IV. Rational Expectations
Friedmants contribution improved matters considerably but
not, according to Lucas (1981, pp. 90-95), enough. Suppose
output relative to normal is systematically related to the
unexpected rate of change of some nominal variable, as Friedmants
reformulation would imply. Then output could still be kept high
(relative to normal) permanently if actual inflation could be
kept permanently above the r.ate expected. Such a possibility
was, moreover, permitted by Friedmants model of expectational
behavior, adaptive expectations.To rule out the implausible
possibility of real enrichment by monetary means, Lucas suggested
adoption of the hypothesis of rational expectations-—i.e., the
absence of any systematic relation between expectational errors
and information available to agents at the time of expectation
—5— -formation. This hypothesis was also necessary, Lucas indicated
(1981,p. 285), to avoid the implication of sub-optimal behavior
by individuals.
In addition, and as importantly, Lucas (1981, pp.66—89)
proposed a new theory of price stickiness. Instead of some
algebraic representation of price adjustments (executed by some
unspecified agent) in response to excess demand, Lucas suggested
a model based on information limitations faced by individual
sellers.The crucially desirable feature of this new approach
was its strategy of explaining incomplete price responses to
monetary shocks——and thus non—zero quantity responses——in terms
of choices made by optimizing agents in light of their own
objectives and constraints.This strategy was adopted not for
aesthetic reasons, but in order to produce a model that would be
well—designed fortheKeynesianobjective ofguiding
macroeconomic policy.Such would not be possible with an
algebraic price adjustment equation, for the latter would give
the analyst no basis for knowing whether the relation would
itself shift if policy were substantially altered——which is
crucial because such a shift would invalidate his predictions
about the effects of the 'pQlicy change.It is necessary,
according to this view, to understand the nature of price
sluggishness to know if its quantitative manifestation will
remain intact in the face of altered conditions.
V. Recent Developments
LucasTs approach gained much support during the late 1970s
but today (i.e., December 29, 1986) matters are rather unsettled.
—6—A major reason for this condition is thatthespecific
informational specification proposed in Lucas's model——which
requires agents to be devoid of knowledge concerning current
monetary conditions——has come to be viewed as inapplicable to
today's developed economies.6And no other model has been
devisedthat combinesempiricalaccuracywith a price
adjustment sector that is derived from individuals' objectives
and constraints.
Consequently, there has been a splintering of opinion, with
prominent researchers promoting widely divergent strategies. One
small but significant group has embraced an ultraclassical "real
business cyclett position, according to which aggregative output
fluctuations are induced almost entirely by technology shocks,
with money—output correlations occurring onlybecause the
monetarysystemresponds to thesefluctuations. Most
macroeconomists are highly skeptical of this position; some of my
own reasons are outlined in McCallum (1986).
A more sizeable group has reacted against the postulate that
sluggish price adjustments need to be explained in terms of
individuals' objectives and constraints. It is better, according
to this view, to use a porly understood but empirically
substantiated price adjustment relation than to
pretend——counterfactually——that all nominal adjustmentstake
place promptly. One's econometric model will then track the data
better and the adjustment relation will be unlikely to shift much
or rapidly when policy changes are undertaken.
It is hard to keep from having considerable sympathy with
—7—
-this view. But the logic of the "Lucas critique" objection is
inescapable. One possible way out of the dilemma, perhaps, is to
proceed with models incorporating price adjustment equations that
can be rationalized by subsidiary arguments, even though these
arguments cannot clearly find expression in terms of the model's
explicittaste and technology representation.This is an
interpretation that can perhaps be given to John Taylor's (1979)
well-known formulation, though I believe some modifications would
be appropriate.
A pervasive problem in devising well—rationalized models of
price stickiness and monetary effects on real variables is that
taste and technology analysis (even when augmented by monopoly,
asymmetric information, and insurance considerations) typically
proceeds entirely in real terms. Accordingly, any such models
that rationalizethepredeterminationof prices do so,
appearances notwithstanding, in terms of real (i.e., indexed)
prices and therefore fail to explain the crucial phenomena. In
an attempt to remedy this weakness, Ihave constructed an
argument that justifies the possible reinterpretation of some
models of this type in terms of nominal prices (McCallum, 1986)
The basic idea is unimpressively simple: the benefits to an
individual obtained from indexation are exceedinglysmall.
Therefore, for small and non—ongoing transactions, the tiny
computational costs of expressing prices in indexed form will
outweigh the benefits. For such transactions, stickiness will
then pertain to nominal prices.
This last argument is not entirely immune to the Lucas
—8—critique:in a regime with more rapid inflation, the benefits
from indexation may be greater. The implied model incorporates,
in other words, a "rule of thumb" that would tend to be revised
if placed under severe strain. But the argument does not abandon
rationality as an essential ingredient.In this respect it
differs from some more extreme suggestions that have recently
been put forth by other writers in response to the dilemma noted
above.I will conclude by briefly considering two of these other
positions.
One, expressed most prominently by Akerlof and Yellen (1985),
suggests that certain small departures from rational behavior on
the part of individual agents will have very small effects on
these individuals' utility levels. Yet if many individuals are
engaged in these small departures, the aggregative consequences
can be quite large. In my opinion, this argument is sensible but
in one respect misstated. The point is that if the model used
in the implicit definition of "rational behavior" neglects some
small computational or adjustment costs, then the agents' choices
hypothesized by Akerlof and Yellen may in fact be entirely
rational. Under this interpretation, the argument becomes rather
similar to the one given two pai.agraphs above.
The second example is the proposed abandonment of rational
expectations.Here I would emphasize that to concentrate on the
question "Are expectations rational?" is to miss the true issue.
Of course there are empirical departures from the hypothesized
orthogonality conditions, but can the same departures plausibly
be relied upon to hold in the future? The answer is No. A
- —9—better way to proceed would be to suggest that recognition of
adjustment and computational costs might lead toweakerformal
representations of expectationa].rationality——e.g., that
expectational errors have unconditional (but not conditional)
means of zero. But such an approach would (again) not actually
represent the abandonment of rationality. A true abandonment
would, in my opinion, constitute suicide for the profession.
It is necessary to stop at this point. Some readers may feel
that the foregoing is not actually a history of Keynesian
macroeconomics, and I would have to agree that it neglects many
interesting and significant matters.But I would strenuously
argue that it outlines the main developments concerning the
single most important aspect of Keynesian economics——or, perhaps,
macroeconomics more generally.
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—11—Footnotes
1. See Marshal]. (1887, p. 358) and Lavington (1922, pp. 48—51
and 81—86).
2. Numerous examples are detailed by Patinkin (1956) (1982).
3. Patinkin (1982) has emphasized the originality of Keynes's
insight that, with fixed prices, output adjustments can provide
an equilibrating mechanism. This argument holds in a clean form,
however, only in a model in which interest rate adjustments are
suppressed by the unsatisfactory device of treating investment as
exogenous.
4. Here reference is to the surge of interest in so—called
"disequilibrium" or "fixed—price" analysis. My claim is not that
distinguished theorists actually embraced the policy procedure
described, but that their writings could have easily been
interpreted by policymakers as providing support for such a
procedure.
5. Over actual time, not the meta-time of stability analysis
such as Patinkins (1956, pp. 152—158 and 342—351).
6. The specification is much more applicable to the economies
that Keynes was concerned with in the 1920s and 193Os.
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